Some rules for Los Castillejos

As seen in previous posts, the combat of Castillejos is a one-side affaire biased against the Spanish becasue both factors, the quality and size of the involved forces were on the French side. The following are some modifications or home-rules, designed to give Ballesteros a chance to stand and achieve his objectives: to delay Gazan until the night, to cause the greater number of French casualties at the lowe cost and to escape towards Portugal.

Notes All Spanish units are on the table. The duration of the game is 16 Turns. Bonus Turns are allowed rolling 2D10 instead 2D6. French are the first side. There are not geographical objectives.

The Tiradores de Barbastro In the actual battle, Ballesteros placed some companies of tirailleurs as a first line. This role can be played by the Tiradores de Barbastro. Roll 1D6 and the result is the number of light companies placed in advance. On 4 or more, the entire unit is used as irregular.

Entrenched units All infantry units may begin entrenched, except the Tiradores de Barbastro, a light infantry unit.

Viva España! Spanish units add +1 to their Unpredictable rolls if the roll is taken while the unit is entrenched or in a building
Home Field Advantage and the entry point of the reinforcements
The rule is in use but in a somewhat modified way. Ballesteros knows that French reinforcements are on way to outflank him but he don’t know neither the exact entry point nor the exact time of arrival. In the actual battle, Gazan sent Pepin with his first brigade and Remond with his column in a circuitous itinerary to fall on the Ballesteros’s left and right flanks, respectively. Therefore:
(1) For the arrival turn, use 2D10 instead 2D6 (p. 91 of the ruleset)
(2) For the Entry point
- 21me Leg Reg (3 bat.) A3
- 100me Ligne Reg (3 bat.) A5
- Remond column D4/D5 (60% / 40%)

They’ll be back or the Ballesteros goal
If the game ends in a draw, it is considered a Spanish marginal victory, but is almost impossible for Ballesteros to win this battle in a regular way. To give him a higher chance, the Ballesteros’s actual goals must be taken in account, using theis additional rule:
If Ballesteros fails his Army Moral, he does not lose automatically the game. Instead, calculate the actual Army Morale ratio, French/Spanish, using the remaining moral values for each army. Any result lower than 1,67 (the initial French/Spanish ratio) is considered a Marginal Spanish victory.

I hope these rules will give a balanced and funny game!

Edited April 11

Assault of defiles
Lasalle does not allow march columns to fight, so the assaults on defiles, such as bridges, fortified gates, field fortifications, etc. can not be played on the table in a convincing way. There was some friendly discussions in the Lasalle Forum regarding this topics . At last I have used the Scruf proposal:
1) A march column can assault a defile like a bridge, a fortified gate, a fort, etc. It represents not only true march columns, but also all those formations with a very reduced front.
2) It fights at 1/2 dice and with no previous shooting, adding a -2 for "bad terrain" as they will be fighting in cramped quarters.
3) The enemy can use the "cover" or "higher elevation" modifiers when applicable.
3) However the small front, the enemy never halves their dice

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Terrain for Los Castillejos

I have used the only contemporary map of Los Castillejos action (see previous post) as a template for the tabletop map.
The area depicted, shows the twin villages, the northern El Almendro and the southern Villanueva, as well as the most significant heigths around the villages and the road-net spreading from the villages. The north table edge is impassable (except by road) whereas the southern area is more open, although it contains a wooded area, where the Sapanish cavalry was initially hidden from the French view.
To shown the different size of the villages, the built-up area of El Almendro will be represented by two small buildings, whereas the larger Villanueva will have three large buildings and a church. The street maze, typical of the small Spanish villages, will be depicted by a grey area under the building models. The rest of urban features playing a significant role in the fight, the bridges over the small streams and the large stonewall enclosure between the villages, will be also shown. Whereas the accounts of the combat report the existence of many stonewall field enclosures similar to the existente between the villages, helping to the Spanish defense, only some of those will be used on the table for playability.
The next step will be the design of optional rules to add some spice to a very French-biased combat.

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More information for Los Castillejos

Unlike the battle the Barrosa/Chiclana, there are no many information for the combat of Villanueva de los Castillejos, and the references are very scarce because the action is a side affaire in the Soult's campaign against Badajoz. The best, and only map, I have found for this battles is a map included in the CD of the Cartografía de la Guerra de la Independencia, drawn by one colonel José Ibañez in February 1, 1811, and shown below.

The maps emphatises some characteristics of the terrain: the existence of olive oil mills on every heigth in the zone, the presence of several small streams and drain sewers crossed by small bridges and the existence of stone fences enclosing the farming fields, that were used advantageously by the defenders.

This same map is also included in a recent book: "La batalla de Castillejos y la Guerra de la Independencia en el Andévalo occidental" (The Battle of Castillejos and the Peninsular War in the Western Andevalo Shire), writen by Antonio Mira Toscano, Juan Villega Martín and Antonio Suardíaz Figuereo and published by the Diputación de Huelva in 2010.

The book summarizes all available information about this obscure action and includes Spanish, French and British sources. Whereas the last ones only reflect the general aspects of the action, focusing on the rout and subsequent retreat of the Spanish division towards Portugal, the Spanish sources give a greater relevance to the combat and show it like a delaying action, adequately managed an solved by Ballesteros. A key for a more objective appraisal is that Ballesteros's force, routed in Castillejos, was able to return to action in the area in February 5, so maybe the Spanish rout was not so appalling as displayed in the French sources.

For the tactical aspects I have used sources of both sides. For the French the most detailed account is the given in Relation des Siéges et Défenses d'Olivença, de Badajoz et de Campo-Mayor en 1811 et 1812 by J.B Lamare and published in 1825.

"Le 25 (january), à la pointe du jour, les troupes, réunies sous les ordres du général Gazan, se formèrent en colonne, le 9.me de dragons en tète, et se mirent en mouvement dans la direction de Villanueva. Vers les onze heures, en débouchant d'un petit bois, elles aperçurent les Espagnols, occupant les hauteurs de la droite de ce village, et attendant de pied ferme les Français. Le général Gazan se porta alors en avant, pour reconnaître la position, et il envoyait ses ordres aux troupes à mesure qu'elles sortaient du bois. Le général Remond reçut celui de se diriger, avec sa cavalerie et le bataillon du 16.me, par la plaine, sur les derrières de l'ennemi; pendant que le général Pépin, avec la 1.re brigade et une pièce de canon, marchait sur le revers de la côte, attaquant la gauche, et que la 2.me brigade, commandée par le général Maransin, attaquait de front. Cette manœuvre détermina l'ennemi à un mouvement de concentration sur le centre de la ligne, pour défendre Villanueva, ainsi que là position formidable qui le domine. Dans ce but, Ballesteros plaça le régiment de Léon derrière un mur, et mit deux autres régimens en bataille près d'une chapelle, un peu en arrière, pour soutenir celuici, pendant que le reste de ses troupes occupait le point culminant de la position. Telles étaient les dispositions des Espagnols, lorsque, d'après les ordres du général Gazan , le général Maransin, à la tète du 28.me d'infanterie légère, soutenu par le 21.me et le 10o.me de ligne, s'avança au pas de charge, à travers un terrain très-accidenté, èt s'empara à la baïonnette du village : il attaqua ensuite la position avec la plus grande intrépidité , et l'enleva également à la baïonnette, malgré le feu le plus vif. Pendant cette vigoureuse attaque, un détachement de cavalerie, commandé par le chef d'escadron d'Arnaud, pénétra dans Villanueva, sabra dans les rues un grand nombre de fuyards, et acheva la déroute de l'ennemi, qui laissa sur le champ de bataille un grand nombre de morts et de blessés. Le général Remond, qui n'avait pu prendre part à l'action, à cause des difficultés du terrain et de la retraite précipitée des Espagnols, se mit à leur poursuite jusqu'à la Guadiana, les obligea de repasser ce fleuve avant la nuit, et de se réfugier en Portugal."

On the other side, Ballesteros himself gives the following account published in the Government Official Journal Gazeta de la Regencia de España e Indias No. 19, February 12, 1811, and shown below in graphical format (sorry no digital transcription available, but you can click on the image and read the document !)

Taking into account both accounts, the authors of the book "La batalla de Castillejos...." propose the following scheme for the action:
I'll use this last scheme as a basis for the terrain of the wargaming refight, as it summarizes the accounts of the both sides. However, as there is a great dissimilarity between the forces and quality of the forces involved in the action, the different objectives of both C-i-C must be taken in account in order to have a fair match!

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The OOB for Los Castillejos

As posted previosuly, the battle or combat of Castillejos was a minor affaire if only the size and quality of the involved forces are considered. Its significance was due to the delay that this mini-campaign Gazan-Ballesteros imposed on the Soult’s plans to take Badajoz (See the previous post).
For the OOB of t I have collated the information found in the bibliography given below. There is only a text specifically devoted to the battle and the campaign “La Batalla de los Castillejos y la Guerra de la Independencia en el Andévalo Occidental” containing very interesting information as well as the only existent military map of the battle. The Ballesteros’s force was around 5,000 men strong included around 1,000 combatants, the Cazadores de Barbastro and 400 cavalrymen, from the Condado de Niebla division of the general Copons. On the other side, Gazan was reinforced by the column Remond composed by one battalion of the 16e Legere, the 9e Regiment de Dragons and two light guns, so he was near 7,000 strong. For the statistics of the units, I have followed the Lasalle rule-set almost to the, using the 'Peninsula' lists for both contenders. My final proposal is:

Spanish Army Moral 18 Break point 6
7 Battalions/2 Regiments/C-i-C Ballesteros (-1/-)

First Line Moreda (-1/-)
Lena R/E/SK1
Pravia U/A/SK1
Barbastro U/A/SK2

Reserve Gastelu (-1/*)
León U/A/SK1
Cangas de Tineo R/E/SK1
Castropol S/A/SK1
Infiesto U/A/SK1

Cavalry Sisternes (-/-)
Reg. Provisional de Santiago S/A
Húsares de Castilla S/A

French Army Moral 30 ; Break point 10
13 Battalions/1 Regiments/2 Batteries
C-i-C Gazan (-/-)

1st Brigade Pepin(-/*)
1/21 Leg. Reg. R/E/SK2
2/21 Leg. Reg. R/A/SK1
3/21 Leg. Reg. R/A/SK1
1/100 Ligne Reg. R/E/SK2
2/100 Ligne Reg. R/A/SK1
3/100 Ligne Reg. R/A/SK1

2nd Brigade Maransin (+1/*)
1/28 Leg. Reg. R/E/SK2
2/28 Leg. Reg. R/A/SK1
3/28 Leg. Reg. R/A/SK1
1/103 Ligne Reg. R/E/SK2
2/103 Ligne Reg. R/A/SK1
3/103 Ligne Reg. R/A/SK1

Artillery Foot/2 cannons/ Medium/ 1 How

Column Remond (-/-)
1/16 Leg. Reg. R/E/SK2
9th Dragoon Reg. R/E/Sh/Pu
Artillery Horse/1 cannon/Light

As Lasalle normal 4-bases units represent about 500 men for infantry and 400 men for cavalry, the final numbers of both sides are very similar to the given in the bibliography, i.e. 5,000 Spanish and 7.000 French.

The difference in numbers and quality between the contenders made this combat a very French-biased affaire. This can be modulated by taking in account the different goals pursued by the two C-i-C. Thus, whereas Ballesteros was only playing a delaying action before retreating towards Portugal, on the other side Gazan wanted the destruction or dispersal of the Spanish force. So some home-rules must be devised to give a chance to Ballesteros!

P.S. A funny note. Amongst the Ballesteros units stand the Cazadores de Barbastro, the real unit that inspired the Armand d'Arc's fictitious 'Cazadores de Balbastro', that is fighting in the Armand's colonial campaign commanded by my great-great-great... father Rafael Pardo!


Bibliography
- Gómez de Arreche y Moro, José
Guerra de la Independencia. Historia militar de españa de 1808 a 1914
Tomo IX
Depósito de la Guerra, Madrid, 1895

- Lamare, Jean-Baptiste Hippolyte
Relation des siéges et défenses d’Olivença, de Badajoz et de Campo-Maior en 1811 et 1812
Anselin et Pochard Editeurs, Paris 1825

- Mira Toscazo, Antonio, Villegas Martín, Juan y Suardíaz Figueres, Antonio
La Batalla de los Castillejos y la Guerra de la Independencia en el Andévalo Occidental
Diputación de Huelva, Huelva 2010

- Queipo de Llano y Ruiz de Saravia, José María (Conde de Toreno)
Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de EspañaTomo III
Martín Alegría, Madrid 1847

- Sañudo, J.J. 'Base de Datos sobre las Unidades Militares en la Guerra de la Independencia', Ministerio de defensa, Madrid, 2007

- Victoires, conquêtes, desastres, revers et guerres civiles des français de 1792 a 1815
C.L.F. Panckoucke Editeur
Volume 20, Paris 1820

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The French siege of Badajoz (1811)

The Spanish fortress of Badajoz was, along Elvas in Portugal, the key for the southern invasion corridor between Spain and Portugal. At the start of 1811 Badajoz was in Spanish hands, thus preventing the French armies in southern Spain from intervening in Portugal. The Marshall Soult's invasion of Extremadura in 1811 was a necessary previous step in order to enter in Portugal to help Massena, camped in front of the Torres Vedras Lines (incidentally it originated the decreasing of the strenght of French forces besieging Cadiz, that triggered the Allied combined operation leading to the battle of Barrosa/Chiclana). During his approach, Soult was forced to detach the Gazan division to chase the Ballesteros's small Spanish force menacing the left flank of the invasion force (See the battle of Villanueva de los Castillejos). Left with a very weakened force, Soult took the minor fortress of Olivenza (See the Siege of Olivenza). All those events produced an unexpected delay in the Soult's plans that on the long term impeded him to help Massena.

Badajoz in 1811-1812 was protected by some of the strongest fortifications in Spain including a castle. The town was built on the southern bank of the Guadiana River (see the map taken from the Lipscombe's Peninsular War Atlas ) including two outlying forts – the Picurina Fort to the east and the Pardaleras Fort to the south of the town. The town was overlooked by the Fort of San Cristobal on the northern bank of the Guadiana and a Tete du Pont Fort protected the bridge connecting this bank with the town.

The French siege can be divided into four phases:

(1) From 27 January until 5 February the garrison (5,000 men under the General Rafael Menacho y Tutlló) stood alone, while Soult’s army slowly came back together. Soult had initially 6,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and part of his siege train (ten companies of artillery and six of sappers), with the rest trailing behind him on the mountain roads. The Gazan division was still chasing Ballesteros one hundred and twenty miles to the south.

(2) On 6 February a Spanish relief army under General Mendizabal, breaking the French blockade, but this phase ended when the Spanish suffered a major defeat (See the battle of the Gevora 19 February 1811).

(3) The third phase saw the French re-establish their blockade, while General Menacho continued to conduct an active defence of the town. On 11 February the French had captured the Pardaleras fort, but it had not proved to be as valuable as they had expected, and was under constant bombardment from Badajoz. It took the French until 24 February to open their first gun battery by the fort, and their trenches only began to advance towards the walls on 28 February. By 3 March the French were ready to break the counterscarp and get into the ditch, but another Spanish sortie drove them back. One of the victims of this sortie was Menacho, killed while watching the attack. His replacement by General José Imaz marked the start of the fourth phase of the siege.Imaz was a much less active confident commander. Under his command no more sorties were made.

(4) On 8th March, after Soult received the news of the Massena's evacuation of his positions and the landing of Allied forces in the rearguard of the French leading to the battle of Barrosa/Chiclana, the attack on the walls made rapid progress: the counterscarp was destroyed, and a French gun battery was able to open fire on the walls from only sixty yards. By the morning of 10 March a breach seventy feet wide had been opened in the walls. At 9 am a parlementaire was sent into Badajoz to summon Imaz to surrender.

He responded by holding a council of war to decide if the defence should continue. Although Badajoz was now blockaded, semaphore messages could still be received from Elvas, and on 9 March Imaz had been informed that a relieving Anglo-Portuguese 15,0000 strong force under General Beresford was on its way. During the council of war he kept this information secret, even though most of his officers suggested that the defence should only go on if a relief force was on its way. Unaware that Beresford was on his way, thirteen of Imaz’s voted to capitulate. Imaz himself voted to fight on, and them immediately opened negotiations with the French representative.

On 3pm on 10 March Imaz surrendered. The French occupied the forts on the northern shore that day, and the city itself on the following day. 7,880 Spanish troops marched into captivity on the morning of 11 March. Another 1,100 were too sick to leave the hospital, and the Spanish suffered a total of 1,851 casualties. The French had suffered 2,000 casualties, but had captured one of the strongest fortresses in Spain, and a key position on the Portuguese-Spanish border. It would take the British three sieges to recapture the city, which finally fell into Allied hands in April 1812.

Taken from History of War and from Badajoz 1811-1812 the best site about the Bicentenial of the Badajoz events during the Peninsular War.

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200 years ago: the battle of Barrosa/Chiclana

Cádiz had been invested by the French in January 1810 by a 25,000-strong French army commanded by Victor, but in March of 1811 a reduction in the besieging army (caused by the march of almost a third of Victor's troops accompanying Soult in his assault on Badajoz) gave its garrison of Anglo-Spanish troops an opportunity to lift the siege. Their plan was to ship an expeditionary force 100 km south along the coast from Cádiz so as to launch an attack against Victor from inland.
The force comprised 4,000 men British under Graham, 8,000 men of two Spanish divisions led by Lardizabal and the Prince of Anglona, four squadrons of cavalry under Col. Samuel Ford Whittingham - an English officer serving with the Spanish army - 1,000 infantry from Gibraltar and 1,600 Spaniards from an irregular force led by Beguines. The overall command was given to Lapeña, the senior officer at Cádiz.
After several chaotic night marches, Lapeña diverted from his original intention deciding instead to march by the coast road towards Cádiz. Victor prepared a trap in the plain between the town of Chiclana and Barrosa Hill (known now as the Loma de Sancti-Petri). Using one division under Villatte to block the road into Cádiz, Victor kept two divisions under Leval and Ruffin out-of-sight in readiness to make a surprise flank attack that fell on the single Anglo-Portuguese rearguard division under the command of Sir Thomas Graham.
Following a fierce battle on two fronts, the British succeeded in routing the attacking French forces. Although some Spanish units also participated in the fight. The French fled towards Chiclana.
In the other side of the field, Lapeña was fighting another combat against Villatte. This last, with his rearguard menaced by Zayas's forces (from Cadiz) and Lapeña, retreated behind the Almansa stream and after towards Chiclana.

Lapeña refused to follow the French retreat so these were able to regroup and reoccupy their siege lines so the Graham's tactical victory proved to have little strategic effect and the siege remained until finally being lifted on 24 August 1812.

Bibliography
- Fortescue, J.W. (1917) 'A History of the British Army', Volume 8 (a 'googled' book downloaded some years ago)
- Lipscombe Nick (2010), 'The Peninsular War Atlas', Osprey
- López Fernández, JA (2010)' Chiclana 1811. La defensa de Cádiz' Guerreros y Batallas nº 65, Almena Editorial
- Martínez Valverde, Carlos (1961) 'El movimiento envolvente contra la línea francesa frente a Cádiz en 1811 y la batalla de Chiclana', Revista de Historia Militar, nº 8, pp 65-112
- Napier, W.F.P. (1833) 'History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814', Volume 3
- Oman, Charles (1911), 'A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV', Greenhill Books 2004
- Queipo de Llano y Ruiz de Saravia, José María, Conde de Toreno (1835), 'Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolucion de España, Volumen 4
- Sañudo, J.J. 'Base de Datos sobre las Unidades Militares en la Guerra de la Independencia', Ministerio de defensa, Madrid, 2007

For a refight of the battle (the British zone) with Lasalle, you can see the previous posts about Chiclana/Barrosa and the AAR and pictures in the main web-site. The result was similar to the historical one, so Graham could be appointed Duke of Boar's Head Hill by the grateful Spanish Cortes!.

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